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During the 2006-07 college basketball season, two young centers dominated their
respective competition. 1 At Ohio State University, Greg Oden, a 7’0”, 257-pound
freshman, born January 22, 1988, burst onto the scene, averaging 15.5 points and 9.7
rebounds per game. 2 After leading Ohio State University to the national championship
game, Oden declared himself eligible for the National Basketball Association (NBA)
draft. 3 Oden was selected with the first pick overall by the Portland Trailblazers and
signed a contract worth $3.885 million in 2007-08 and $4.176 million in 2008-09. 4 Oden
also signed endorsement contracts with the Nike and Topps companies, worth an
estimated minimum of $10 million per year. 5
Meanwhile, at Oklahoma University, Courtney Paris, a 6’4”, 250-pound
sophomore, born September 21, 1987, also burst onto the basketball scene, averaging an
even more dominant 23.6 points and 16.2 rebounds per game. 6 After leading Oklahoma
University into the women’s National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
*

Marc Edelman, Esq. (MarcEdelman@aol.com) is a sports-law professor at New York Law School and
Seton Hall University and a sports/antitrust attorney in private practice. Mr. Edelman earned his B.S. in
economics magna cum laude from the Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania) and his J.D./M.A. cum
laude from the University of Michigan.
**
C. Keith Harrison is an Associate Professor at the University of Central Florida in the DeVos Sport
Business Management Program in the College of Business Administration. Dr. Harrison has published
numerous peer-reviewed articles and scholarly book chapters on his research and is CEO and co-founder of
Scholar-Baller™, a non-profit organization that uses sports and entertainment to bridge the gap between
academic achievement and popular culture.
1
See Michael David Smith, Why the Sooners Will Always Have Paris, N.Y. SUN, Mar. 19, 2007, at 18.
2
See Jay Posner & Hank Wesch, San Antonio: A Closer Look at the Region, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Mar. 12, 2007, at E15; Biography of Greg Oden, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Oden (last visited Jan.
15, 2008).
3
See Shira Springer, Oden Declares He’ll Enter NBA, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2007, at 7D.
4
See Associated Press, Blazers, Top Pick Oden Ink Contract, AUGUSTA CHRON., Aug. 3, 2007, at C5.
5
See Oden Signs Deal with Nike, CINCINNATI POST, June 23, 2007, at B4 (stating that Greg Oden’s
contract with Topps will pay him $3 million per year and his contract with Nike will pay him an
unannounced amount); Durant Inks $60 Million Deal with Nike, OLYMPIAN (Olympia, WA), July 19, 2007,
available at http://www.theolympian.com/basketball/story/166708.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008) (stating
that Kevin Durant, who is the same age as Oden and was selected immediately after Oden in the 2007 draft,
signed a seven-year, $60 million contract with Nike).
6
See Lynn Jacobsen, NCAA Women’s Tournament 2007: Board Game, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 17, 2007, at
B1; Joanne Klimovich Harrop, Women’s Players are Getting Bigger – and Better, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV.,
Mar. 18, 2007; Biography of Courtney Paris, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Courtney_Paris (last visited Jan.
15, 2008).
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tournament, Paris probably would have desired the option to have declared herself
eligible for the Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA) draft, much as Oden
did for the NBA draft. 7 However, even though Paris was both older and more formally
educated than Oden, Paris was prevented from declaring herself for the draft by the
WNBA age/education policy, which requires all prospective women’s basketball players
to wait four years after high school graduation before turning professional. 8 As a result,
Paris was left with just two feasible options: stay at Oklahoma University for two more
years and graduate, while earning no immediate income, or take the WNBA to court over
its age/education policy. Ultimately, she decided to remain in school.
Based on the two drastically different sets of circumstances that existed for Oden
and Paris as a result of their respective genders, it is clear that the legal and ethical impact
of age/education policies in professional sports, although often portrayed as a men’s
issue, has an equally great impact upon the rights, behaviors, and responsibilities of
female athletes. In fact, the WNBA age/education policy is the only policy in any
established professional sports league that precludes a potential class of players from
entering the professional leagues until their expected dates of college graduation.9
The WNBA’s strict age/education policy therefore invokes substantial debate about
both its legality and ethicality, not only from a traditional antitrust perspective, but also
based on issues related to gender equity. 10 Indeed, that male basketball players are
allowed to enter the NBA only one year after graduating from high school, whereas
female basketball players have to wait four years before entering the WNBA, highlights
the extreme differences in bargaining power between American male and female athletes.
This article discusses the WNBA age/education policy from a legal, cultural, and
ethical perspective. Part One of this article discusses the women’s basketball landscape
in terms of sociology, race, and gender. Part Two discusses the history of women’s
basketball in America, as well as the history of the WNBA and its age/education policy.
Part Three explains the legal issues that underlie an antitrust challenge to the WNBA
age/education policy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Part Four discusses the likely
effect on society if the courts were to overturn the WNBA age/education policy.
I. SOCIOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE OF WOMEN’S BASKETBALL IN AMERICA

¶6

The limited opportunity for women to perform as professional athletes in a male
dominated culture is well documented in terms of the resources devoted to, popularity of,
and historical discrimination against women’s athletics. 11 Until recently, professional
athletics were primarily for men. 12 With the late integration of women into professional
sports, the role of the female athlete has developed differently. Organizations such as the
NCAA have played a major role in promoting the ideology of the well-rounded,
7

See Smith, supra note 1.
Id.
9
Id.
10
See C. Keith Harrison, Analyzing the Legal and Societal Effects of the WNBA’s Mandatory Education
Policy, 13 TEX. ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 11 (2004) (Marc Edelman provided legal analysis and drafted
substantial sections for this article. His name was withheld from the list of authors at the request of his
previous employer, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.).
11
ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM & CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE
SPORTS 54 (1999).
12
JEAN O’REILLY & SUSAN K. CAHN, WOMEN AND SPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY
READER xi (2007).
8
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traditionally educated female athlete. 13 This ideology contrasts somewhat with the
notion of the ruggedly individualistic male athlete.
The relationship between women in sports and their impact on young girls indicates
that image is everything. 14 Since the emergence of women’s collegiate and professional
sports, young girls have begun to participate in athletics at all-time high rates.15 While
Title IX has been a major factor in cultivating women’s athletics over the last thirty years,
the age/education policy of the WNBA may contribute to a whole new culture of
scholarly women that happen to play basketball. 16 For instance, female student-athletes
graduate from college at a higher rate than any other student in American higher
education. 17
Indeed, women in sports are often the best examples of this synergy between
academic and athletic excellence. 18 Specifically with women’s basketball, Candace
Parker of the Tennessee Volunteers is presently one of the high profile superstars in
collegiate athletics, and she is a scholar-athlete as well. 19 Parker is recognized as a
VolScholar, which is the University of Tennessee’s adapted version of the national
program Scholar-Baller™. 20 The fact that Parker is a woman of color (AfricanAmerican) also exemplifies the growth of opportunities that African-American women
now enjoy in college as scholars and athletes. These opportunities have come with
struggles, especially for African-American women that experience challenges of both
gender and racial discrimination. 21
Nevertheless, there is also another side to the synergy between academics and
athletics. The WNBA rule inequitably requires prospective women’s professional
basketball players to first offer their services for four years to a college basketball
program, even while their male counterparts are allowed to earn money playing
13

Id. at xii.
Harrison, supra note 10, at 11.
15
O’REILLY & CAHN, supra note 12, at xii.
16
Harrison, supra note 10, at 11.
17
See National Collegiate Athletic Association Home Page, http://www.ncaa.org (last visited Jan. 15,
2008).
18
O’REILLY & CAHN, supra note 12, at 71.
19
University of Tennessee Website, http://utladyvols.com/home (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
20
Scholar-Baller™ is an innovative movement and program that celebrates the success of both students
with a 3.0 grade point average (GPA) or better and those below that GPA who demonstrate gradual
academic momentum and significant educational improvement. Eddie Comeaux & C. Keith Harrison, A
Theoretical Model of Scholar Baller Success (under review and presented at the American Educational
Research Association Annual Meeting in Chicago, Ill., Mar. 2007) (manuscript at 3, on file with authors);
see also Scholar-Baller™ Home Page, http://www.scholarballer.org (last visited Jan. 15. 2008).
21
In their 1993 article, The African American Female in Collegiate Sports: Sexism and Racism, Doris
Corbett and William Johnson identify twelve racial and sexual barriers surrounding the involvement of the
African-American woman in athletics. These barriers include: (1) limited financial support; (2) physical
education teachers who often lack the background to coach competitive teams; (3) lack of administrative
support where competitive programs and interest exist; (4) lack of positive opinion leaders as role models
who are African-American sportswomen; (5) tendency of White coaches to associate the Black female
athletes with only certain sports (e.g., basketball and track and field); (6) discrimination in team selection,
particularly in the sports of volleyball and basketball; (7) discrimination in hiring; (8) limited skilldevelopment opportunities; (9) limited coaches’ hours; (10) limited officials; (11) intimidation from male
coaches and fans; and (12) unwillingness to travel. Considering each of these factors, approximately half
of college and professional women’s basketball is comprised of African-American women. See generally
Doris Corbett & William Johnson, The African American Female in Collegiate Sports: Sexism and Racism,
in RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN ATHLETE’S EXPERIENCE 199 (Dana D.
Brooks & Ronald C. Althouse eds., 1993).
14
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basketball on the professional level.22 Moreover, one notion of this policy is that talented
female athletes must delay their personal gratification and first achieve academic pursuits
prescribed to them by society and the corporate sport structure. This reinforces an old
and dangerous stereotype of women as being necessarily philanthropic creatures (i.e.
caring, passive, and non-aggressive). Conversely, men are allowed to be
individualistic. 23 This clash between the educational ideals of female student-athletes
and the merits of personal autonomy complicate evaluating the ethics underlying the
WNBA age/education policy.
II. THE HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL WOMEN’S BASKETBALL
¶10

Founded in 1996, the WNBA consists of fourteen teams, is more mature in terms of
age than the NBA, and has an ethnic makeup of approximately sixty percent AfricanAmerican and forty percent Caucasian players. 24 Based on WNBA statistics, over ninety
percent of the players have earned a bachelor’s degree from a four-year institution and
twenty percent have earned graduate degrees. This culture of education, which in
essence requires WNBA players to earn college degrees, is in stark contrast to the
WNBA players’ peers in the NBA, National Football League (NFL), Major League
Baseball (MLB), and the National Hockey League (NHL).
A. The Early Struggles of Women’s Professional Basketball in America

¶11

In its early years, American women’s professional basketball was filled with
various short-lived ventures. After generations of men’s professional basketball leagues
operating without a female counterpart, two women’s professional basketball leagues
burst onto the scene in the late 1970s: the Ladies Professional Basketball Association
(LPBA) and the Women’s Professional Basketball League (WBL). 25 Both leagues were
defunct by 1981. 26
¶12
Both the LPBA and the WBL struggled from the very beginning because of their
high salaries, low sponsorship revenues, and team owners without significant investment
income. 27 Unlike the NBA, neither female professional basketball league had the benefit
of a television contract. 28 Without regular television revenues, neither league was able to
turn a profit. 29

22

See Smith, supra note 1.
JAY J. COAKLEY, SPORT IN SOCIETY 264 (2007); GAIL BEDERMAN, MANLINESS & CIVILIZATION: A
CULTURAL HISTORY OF GENDER AND RACE IN THE U.S. 121 (1995).
24
See generally RICHARD E. LAPCHICK & KEVIN J. MATTHEWS, RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD
(2001); see also WNBA Home Page, http://www.wnba.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
25
See Donna Carter, Women’s Pro Basketball League Planned, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1990, at C14. The
WBL debuted on December 9, 1978, but disbanded in 1981, whereas the LPBA was launched in 1980 and
failed within a few months. See Anna Maria Basquez, Showtime for Shelley, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS
(Denver, CO), July 16, 1996, at 3D.
26
See Basquez, supra note 25, at 3D.
27
See Carter, supra note 25, at C14. See also Idea for NBA: Female League, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec.
26, 1992, at B7.
28
See Bill Jauss, Geraty Digs Up Old Game - Women’s League May Sprout Again, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17,
1992, at Sports 8.
29
See id.
23
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By 1981, both the LPBA and WBL had folded, leaving the United States without
professional women’s basketball. 30 In fact, women’s basketball did not return to
America for nine years. On March 15, 1990, the Women’s Sports Association
Professional Basketball League (WSAPBL) presented itself as the first of several small,
regional women’s basketball leagues to emerge in America. 31 The WSAPBL attempted
to control expenses by limiting its host cities to the greater California area. 32 After some
initial success, other regional women’s leagues followed, such as the Women’s World
Basketball Association (WWBA) in the Midwest, 33 and the Liberty Basketball
Association (LBA) on the East Coast. 34
¶14
Like many small, startup, professional sports leagues, the new, regional women’s
leagues attempted to draw fan interest by tinkering with the game’s traditional rules. For
example, the LBA lowered the basket by one foot so women could more easily slamdunk. 35 Despite such ingenuity, the LBA disbanded within one season due to a
recession. 36 The other regional women’s basketball leagues also ceased to exist soon
thereafter.
B. From Zero Leagues to Two—the Emergence of the ABL and the WNBA
¶15

With the failure of regional, women’s basketball leagues, sports entrepreneurs in
the 1990s decided to re-launch a national women’s professional basketball league. As
early as the Summer Olympics in 1992, NBA Commissioner David Stern began to
consider the possibility of the NBA funding a national, upstart women’s basketball
league. 37 Even before Stern could propose a business plan, however, California
entrepreneur Steve Hams and eleven other investors announced the formation of their
own women’s basketball league: the American Basketball League (ABL). 38
¶16
Initially an eight-team league, the ABL business plan included teams playing a
forty-game season between the months of October and February, overlapping with the
first half of the NBA season. 39 The original host cities included Atlanta, Columbus,
Denver, Hartford/Springfield, Portland, Richmond, Seattle, and San Jose, where the
30

See Carter, supra note 25, at 14.
See id.
32
See id.
33
See, e.g., John Bannon, Pro’s League for Women’s Basketball Tries Again, USA TODAY, July 2, 1991,
at 2C.
34
For a more detailed analysis of the LBA, see Jeff Williams, New Women’s Pro League, NEWSDAY, Dec.
18, 1990, at 131; see also Ailene Voisin, New LBA Hopes to Become NBA for Women, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Jan. 20, 1991, at H3; Debbie Becker, New League Hopes Big Things Come from Smaller
Packaging, USA TODAY, Feb. 18, 1991, at 5C. Initially, the LBA showed signs of success, drawing 10,753
fans to their inaugural game in Auburn Hills, MI. See New League Streamlined for Success, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 22, 1991, at Sports 4; see also New Women’s Pro Basketball League Rolling, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Feb. 24, 1991, at 9F.
35
See Ailene Voisin, Women’s Pro League Plans Comeback, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 2, 1993, at E13.
36
See id.
37
See David Aldridge, NBA’s Stern Defends Dream Team’s Quarters, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1992, at F8.
38
See Earl Gustkey, Women Have Two New Incentives this Season, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1995, at C9; see
also Dick Rockne, Women’s Pro Hoops in Seattle? Proposed League Would Feature Some Members of
National Team, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at D2; Rob Oller, Proposed League Still Trying to Take
Flight, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 26, 1996, at 10D; American Basketball League, DAILY NEWS (New
York, N.Y.), Oct. 6, 1996, at 1C.
39
See American Basketball League, supra note 38; see also Dick Rockne, Women’s Pro League Takes
Shot in Seattle, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 1996, at C1.
31
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league headquarters was located. 40 According to this business plan, all ABL teams at
least initially would be owned and operated by the ABL as a single entity, and the league
would only draft players that had graduated from college. 41
In November 1995, Hams announced that the ABL had signed nine of the eleven
players on the women’s United States Olympic team, each to two-year professional
contracts with non-compete clauses—a move intended to fortify the league’s position as
the premier home of women’s professional basketball. 42 According to Hams, the league
planned to pay each of the U.S. Olympic team players $125,000 a year, maintain a league
average salary of $70,000 a year, and institute a league minimum salary of $40,000—all
decisions intended to thwart the emergence of a competitor league. 43 Additionally, the
ABL secured sponsorship agreements with four major companies: Reebok, First USA
Bank, Lady Foot Locker, and basketball manufacturer Baden. 44
Yet, despite Hams’s best efforts to make the ABL the exclusive women’s
basketball league, on April 24, 1996—almost seven months before the first ABL game—
the NBA announced that it, too, was launching a women’s professional basketball league
(the WNBA), which would begin play in the summer of 1997. 45
Unlike the ABL, the WNBA planned to compete during a ten-week season in the
summer, which did not overlap with the NBA season. 46 Also, the WNBA model enjoyed
the immediate advantage of being backed by the NBA—a well-fortified American
business with powerful management. 47 On June 28, 1996—a full year before the first
WNBA season was to begin—the WNBA entered into a five-year prime-time television
contract with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). 48 In addition, before playing a
single game, the WNBA entered into substantial television pacts with ESPN and the
Lifetime Network. 49 Meanwhile, ABL television coverage was limited to just twelve
Sunday night games on SportsChannel. 50
The ABL was the first league to begin play, and the early results were positive. In
one league-opening game, 5,513 fans witnessed the Colorado Xplosion defeat the Seattle
Reign. 51 That same night, 8,767 fans packed the Hartford Civic Center to see the New
40

See Hartford/Springfield in Women’s League, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 21, 1996, at C2.
See Joey Johnstone, Playing for Pay, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 1, 1996, at Sports 6; Elizabethe Holland,
WNBA Triumphs in Round 3 Against ABL, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 2, 1998, at Sports 23.
42
See Gustkey, supra note 38. These players included: Jennifer Azzi, Katy Steding, Lisa Leslie, Sheryl
Swoopes, Dawn Staley, Teresa Edwards, Ruthie Bolton, Nikki McCray and Carla McGhee. See Tom
Flaherty, Two Other Women’s Leagues to Start this Year, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 2, 1996, at Sports
9C; see also Liz Robbins, NBC to Televise the Women’s NBA, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 28, 1996,
at 2D.
43
See Gustkey, supra note 38.
44
See Celeste E. Whittaker, American Basketball League Facing Uphill Battle, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Oct. 16, 1996, at D3.
45
See Earl Gustkey, NBA to Direct a Women’s League, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at C5.
46
Id.; see also Flaherty, supra note 42.
47
See generally Gustkey, supra note 45.
48
See Robbins, supra note 42. The contract included a promise to broadcast the WNBA on Saturday
afternoons. See Brian Landman, One May Be Better than Two, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 9, 1996, at
1C.
49
See Joanne Korth, Basketball League Channels Energy into TV Deals, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 21,
1996, at 2C.
50
See Tom Flaherty, Basketball Spotlight Will Shine on the ABL, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 15, 1996,
at Sports 12.
51
See Glenn Nelson, Reign Stumbles in First ABL Step, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 19, 1996, at B1.
41
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England Blizzard defeat the Richmond Rage. 52 Throughout the inaugural season, one of
the brightest ABL stars was Jackie Joyner-Kersee, the beloved American 1988 Olympic
champion in the horizontal jump. 53 Even though 1996 Olympic basketball standouts
Sheryl Swoopes and Rebecca Lobo ultimately rejected the ABL, 54 the ABL still hosted
most of the 1996 women’s basketball Olympians. 55 In the inaugural ABL
championships, Valerie Still, a thirty-five-year-old who just four years earlier had been
teaching high school, finished the game with 14 points and 13 rebounds to lead the
Columbus Quest to a 77-64 victory over the Virginia Rage before a sellout crowd of
6,313. 56
¶21
The WNBA meanwhile opened its inaugural season on June 21, 1997, with the
fanfare of an NBA marketing blitz. The league placed teams in New York, Charlotte,
Cleveland, Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Sacramento, and Salt Lake City. 57 Former
NBA Vice President Val Ackerman was promoted to the position of the league’s first
commissioner. 58 Nike, Coca-Cola, and American Express all signed on as premier
league sponsors. 59 In the WNBA model, player salaries were kept below the average
ABL salary rate, and the WNBA initially implemented a league-wide salary cap on all
players’ contracts at $50,000. 60
¶22
With heavy fanfare, 14,284 spectators turned out to the Los Angeles Forum to
watch the first WNBA game between the Los Angeles Sparks and the New York
Liberty. 61 The WNBA also enjoyed opening crowds of 11,455 in Cleveland and 8,915 in
Salt Lake City. 62 By season’s end, the wildly televised and marketed WNBA drastically
exceeded all expectations in fan interest, attracting nearly 9,000 fans per game. 63 From
the abyss emerged the Houston Comets’s Cynthia Cooper as the league’s top-performing
player, averaging a league-best 22.2 points per game. 64 The Houston Comets won the
league’s first championship, 65-51 over the Liberty, 65 and at least in the beginning, it
seemed that two professional basketball leagues could co-exist in America: the traditional
ABL in the winter, and the hyped, dynamic WNBA in the summer.

52

See Blizzard Opens ABL with Win, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1996, at 15B.
See Jere Longman, Jumping to Hoops: Olympian Joyner-Kersee Dribbles Back to Sport of Her Youth
for ABL, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 20, 1996, at 17B.
54
Swoopes initially played for the ABL, but began playing for the WNBA in 1997. See William C.
Rhoden, Women’s N.B.A. Takes First Big Step, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1996, at B20.
55
See W.H. Stickney Jr., Swoopes, Lobo Sign with WNBA, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 24, 1996, at 7B; see also
Stephanie Storm, Women’s League Growing Fast, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 15, 1996, at C12.
56
See Kathy Orton, Quest Is Over For Columbus, WASH. POST, March 12, 1997, at C1.
57
See Mark Asher, WNBA Takes Its Leap Forward, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1996, at C3.
58
See id.
59
See generally Valerie Lister, On the Heels of ABL’s First Season, Women’s NBA Gets Ready to Roll,
USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1997, at 15C; see also Marketing v. Heart: WNBA, ABL in a Death Watch,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 8, 1997, at C10.
60
See Amy Shipley, With Shrewd Planning, WNBA Ends First Season Leagues Ahead, WASH. POST, Aug.
31, 1997, at A23.
61
See Vic Ziegel, WNBA States its Case with Well-Attended Debut, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 22, 1997, at
C4.
62
See id.
63
See generally David Moore, WNBA Establishes Itself as Fan Favorite in Rookie Season, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 4, 1997, at 12B.
64
See W.H. Stickney Jr., Cooper’s Season One to Remember, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 16, 1997, at B8.
65
See id.
53
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C. Survival of the Fittest: How the WNBA Garnered a Monopoly over American
Women’s Basketball
¶23

The two-league women’s basketball format in America, which appeared so
promising in 1997, however, was not to be. The WNBA had no interest in cooperating
with the ABL, and after a few years of fierce competition between the ABL and the
WNBA, the deeper-pocketed WBNA emerged as the sole survivor. 66 The first sign of
conflict between the ABL and the WNBA was in September 1997, when the ABL’s Most
Valuable Player, Nikki McCray, jumped ship to the WNBA. 67 Although McCray
accepted a pay cut from $150,000 in the ABL to $50,000 in the WNBA (the league
maximum), McCray felt that playing in the WNBA would be more profitable in the long
run because of the WNBA’s premier exposure. 68
¶24
Without national broadcast television, the ABL tried to boost its presence by
proposing various joint marketing initiatives with the WNBA, including a proposal for an
inter-league, all-star game. 69 However, the WNBA rejected all ABL overtures, instead
opting to compete directly against the ABL for the women’s basketball market.70 As a
result, the ABL was placed in the undesirable position of needing to offer players
significantly higher salaries to prevent them from defecting to their more prominent
competitor. 71
¶25
Even as the ABL attendance totals increased twenty percent in its second year and
the league announced expansion plans into new cities such as Chicago, 72 the ABL was
heading into a “no win” situation. 73 Spring 1998 was especially telling for the ABL, as
seven of the eight collegiate All-American women’s basketball players signed with the
WNBA. 74 In an interview with the San Francisco Examiner, Gary Cavelli, CEO and cofounder of the ABL acknowledged, “I think we won Rounds 1 and 2, and they’re winning
the third round. We’re definitely behind at this point.” 75

66

See Terry Frei, New Leagues Don’t Follow ABL Lead, DENVER POST, July 2, 2000, at C4.
See Valerie Lister, ABL Says No Bidding War Despite McCray’s Jump, USA TODAY, Sept. 17, 1997, at
10C.
68
Id. (noting that McCray would earn additional income from a personal services contract).
69
See Stephanie Storm, Top Official Proposes ABL-WNBA All-Star Game, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 18,
1998, at C10.
70
See ABL-WNBA All-Star Challenge Dunked, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at C2.
71
See Jeff Z. Klein, Foot Soldiers: The Launch of the WUSA Opens a New Front in Women’s Pro Sports,
VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 24, 2001, at 47 (stating that “the ABL collapsed, largely because of competition from
the heavily promoted, heavily bankrolled WNBA”); see generally Amy Shipley & Karl Hente, Women’s
Pro Hoops Leagues Battle for Position, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 18, 1997, at 7F (discussing the
competition between the ABL and WNBA for players).
72
See generally Athelia Knight, In Its Second Season, ABL Is Above Average: Interest in Sport Helps
Attendance Increase in League, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1998, at C7; see also Phil Rosenthal, Can Jackson Be
Sold on ABL vs. WNBA?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 8, 1998, at Sports 105; Earl Gustkey, Women’s Basketball:
Rumors of Jordan Ownership Keeps the ABL Buzzing, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1998, at C8 (discussing a
rumor that legendary NBA player Michael Jordan had considered buying a stake in the ABL’s Chicago
expansion team).
73
See generally John Deshazier, ABL Hasn’t Scored Enough Points to Win Ratings Game, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 28, 1998, at D1.
74
See Holland, supra note 41; UConn’s Sales to WNBA, DAILY NEWS (New York, N.Y.), Apr. 29, 1998, at
71.
75
Holland, supra note 41 (quoting Cavelli’s interview with the San Francisco Examiner).
67
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While WNBA attendance climbed above 10,000 fans-per-game in its second season
and ownership moved toward expanding the league, 76 the ABL spent its 1998 summer
dissolving its failed Long Beach, California franchise and trying to cope with superstar
Dawn Staley’s defection to the WNBA. 77 The ABL did catch one huge break in the
1998-99 season, as the NBA players went on strike for the first half of their season and
national broadcast television temporarily picked up ABL games as replacement
programming. 78 Nevertheless, once the NBA players returned to action, ABL broadcasts
ceased, and on Tuesday, December 22, 1998, the ABL folded and filed for bankruptcy. 79
D. Transition Game: Changes in the WNBA Structure upon ABL Bankruptcy

¶27

Once the WNBA became the only women’s game in town, the league began to
pursue an expansion strategy, but it was never able to significantly increase its fan base.
After averaging an all-time high of 10,869 fans per game in the 1998 season, WNBA
attendance began to decline steadily, falling below an average of 10,000 fans per game
for the first time in 2000, and then falling below the 9,000 mark in 2003. 80 By 2006,
WNBA average per-game attendance fell all the way to 7,490 fans per game. 81
¶28
With WNBA attendance and revenues declining, players began to take steps to
protect their interests in a declining pie. On November 6, 1998, shortly before the ABL
filed for bankruptcy, the WNBA women’s basketball players made the first step to
change their labor relationship with the WNBA by forming the Women’s National
Basketball Players Association (WNBPA)—the first labor union ever comprised entirely
of professional female athletes. 82 Shortly thereafter, on April 30, 1999, the WNBPA
ratified its first league collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the union. 83
According to the WNBPA website: “The inaugural CBA encompassed significant
advances for WNBA players, and represents for all women, an important step toward pay
equity and general equality.” 84 The CBA established a near seventy-five percent
minimum salary increase for WNBA rookies and a one hundred percent minimum salary
increase for WNBA veterans beyond the minimums that the WNBA had previously
unilaterally imposed. 85 The CBA also provided “year-round health coverage, a
retirement plan, guaranteed contracts and a collective share of licensing income.” 86 Yet,
as compared to the status obtained in collective bargaining by men’s professional sports
76

See Darrell Williams, WNBA Keeps Building on a Good Thing, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.),
Aug. 2, 1998, at C2; see generally Tim Povtak, Disney Makes it Official: Orlando Joins WNBA, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Aug. 14, 1998, at C1.
77
See Susan Slusser, ABL Season to Start 2 Weeks Later, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 3, 1998, at D7.
78
See, e.g. Athelia Knight, NBA’s Loss Is Gain for ABL: Women's League Hits National TV, WASH. POST,
Nov. 26, 1998, at B14.
79
See Melissa Isaacson, Lights Go Out on the ABL: To No One’s Surprise, Boys Club Wins Again, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 23, 1998, at Sports 1.
80
See Kim Callahan, Season By Season WNBA Attendance 1 (2007),
http://womensbasketballonline.com/wnba/attendance/sbsatten.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2008).
81
Id.
82
See WNBA Players Association, About the WNBPA, http://www.wnbpa.com/about_wnbpa.php (last
visited Jan. 15, 2008).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
See id.
86
Id.
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unions, the WNBPA was relatively powerless. The WNBPA was unable to bargain as
aggressively as most men’s sports unions because the WNBA teams regularly threatened
to either shut down the league or lock out the players if the WNBPA did not agree to
certain terms proposed by the league. 87 With the maximum WNBA player salary at the
time standing at just $50,000, most WNBA players had not saved enough money to
sustain a long lockout. 88
¶29
The first CBA between the parties was ratified on April 30, 1999, and expired on
September 15, 2002. 89 On April 25, 2003, the WNBA and WNBPA agreed to a second
collective bargaining agreement. This version of the CBA remains in effect today. 90
According to the WNBPA, advancements in the second CBA include the creation of a
free agency system for WNBA players and the return of player group licensing rights to
WNBA players. 91 However, the pay for WNBA players, as well as the revenue
generated by the WNBA, remained miniscule as compared to that of men’s professional
basketball players.
¶30
Then, in 2003, the WNBA decided to transform its business from a structure
including central ownership in the league overall to a structure including independent
team ownership as exists in the four premier men’s leagues. 92 The impetus for this
transition was an important decision handed down by the First Circuit Court of Appeals
in Fraser v. Major League Soccer, which indicated that the centralized Major League
Soccer structure—in many ways similar to the original structure of the WNBA—did not
necessarily shield the league from antitrust liability. 93 As a result of the WNBA’s
structural change to an independent ownership model, WNBA teams began to
independently manage their own operations and pursue their own players and
sponsorship deals. 94 Nevertheless, this structural change did not affect the coordinated
decision-making of the WNBA, which now occurred through the collective bargaining
process.
87

See, e.g. Bart Hubbuch, WNBA Labor Deal, Draft Put on Hold, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 23,
1999, at 5B (stating that the WNBA postponed its 1999 draft indefinitely and threatened a lockout unless
the players’ union consented to the proposed collective bargaining agreement).
88
This is in contrast to professional athletes in the four premier men’s sports leagues that, based on their
higher salaries, often have more personal reserves. Moreover, in the four premier men’s sports leagues, the
players’ union often keeps a reserve fund to make payments to players in the event of a strike or lockout.
For example, one of the reasons why the Major League Baseball Players Association was able to

sustain such a long work stoppage in 1994 was because it had reserved $200 million in funds to
distribute to players in the event of a work stoppage. See, e.g., Baseball’s Last Gasp is Today,
PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 14, 1994, at Sports 1C (stating that the union planned to begin making payments
to players from its $200 million strike fund).
89
See WNBA Players Association, supra note 82.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See Mel Greenberg, New-Look WNBA to Open 7th Season: 2 Teams Fold, 3 See Change in Ownership,
CHI. TRIB., May 21, 2003, at Sports 9.
93
See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, LLC, 284 F.3d 47, 58-61 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Marc Edelman,
Fan Ownership Can Give UFL a Leg Up on Building Brand Loyalty, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J.,
Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 2007, at 28, 28 (stating “there are probably lingering perceptions of an antitrust advantage
to having 50 percent common ownership amongst teams, even though the decision by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in the 2002 case Fraser v. Major League Soccer indicated that any such antitrust
advantage is dubious.”); Lacie L. Kaiser, The Flight from Single-Entity Structured Sports Leagues, 2
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 9-11 (2004).
94
See generally Kaiser, supra note 93, at 11-13.
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In recent years, many of the top women’s basketball players, unhappy with their
salary prospects in the WNBA, have started spending their off-seasons playing
overseas. 95 A number of American-born players have even indicated their desire to play
exclusively overseas. 96 For example, Tina Thompson, a four-time WNBA champion
with the Houston Comets, recently indicated she may forego the WNBA altogether
because she believes she can triple her WNBA maximum salary by playing exclusively in
Moscow, Russia. 97
E. The WNBA Education Policy

¶32

From their incipient stages, both the WNBA and ABL enforced independent league
regulations to prevent their teams from drafting players that still had NCAA college
eligibility. 98 When the ABL ceased its operations in 1998, however, prospective
women’s basketball players lost the leverage of having two separate leagues vying for
player services. 99 Without two leagues, the only bargaining chip of a player that did not
meet the age/education policy was a threat to play permanently overseas. For some
players with young families well-settled in the United States, that was not a viable option.
¶33
Once the ABL ceased to exist and the WNBA players unionized, the WNBA took
affirmative steps to protect its age/education policy from antitrust scrutiny by adding
references to the league’s age/education policy into the CBA. As currently written,
Article XIII, Section 1 of the CBA, which is entitled “Player Eligibility,” states the
following:
[An American] player is eligible to be selected in the WNBA Draft [only]
if she: (i) will be at least twenty-two (22) years old during the calendar
year in which such Draft is held; (ii) has graduated from a four-year
college or university, or is to graduate from such college or university,
during the calendar year in which such Draft is held; or (iii) attended a
four-year college or university, her original class in such college or
university has already been graduated or is to graduate during the calendar
year in which such Draft is held, and she either has no remaining
intercollegiate eligibility or renounces her remaining intercollegiate

95

See Oscar Dixon, More Players Profit from Testing Waters: Overseas Competition Gives League Reason
for Concern, USA TODAY, Aug. 21. 2007, at 10C.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
See Elizabethe Holland, Holdsclaw will Stay in College Basketball, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 30,
1998, at C6.
99
The emergence of a rival professional sports league often impacts whether the dominant league attempts
to maintain age/education policies. For example, the NFL reduced its age/education policy from four to
three years after Hall of Fame running back Herschel Walker opted to sign with the New Jersey Generals
team in the rival United States Football League after his sophomore year rather than wait the required third
and fourth seasons before entering the NFL. See, e.g., PAUL WEILER & GARY ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE
LAW 201 (3d ed. 2004). Initially, the NFL selectively implemented its rule by granting a limited number of
special exceptions to allow superstar collegiate players, including Barry Sanders, to enter the league early.
See Charean Williams, Got ‘Em – Longhorns Never Seem to Get Burnt by the NFL Draft, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 18, 2005, at 1D. Then, in 1990, the NFL rewrote its longstanding eligibility rule to
allow NFL entry to all players after their junior year of college or three years after high school. Id.
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eligibility by written notice to the WNBA at least ten (10) days prior to
such Draft. 100
In essence, this age/education policy mandates that any American-born player
wait until age twenty-two or complete four years of college before entering the
WNBA. 101
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE WNBA AGE/EDUCATION POLICY
¶34

As of the date of publication, the WNBA age/education policy has not been
challenged in court. 102 However, if challenged, a court might find the WNBA policy
violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act as an illegal group boycott.
A. Legal Standard for Reviewing Group Boycotts

¶35

Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, in pertinent part, that “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in the restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be
illegal.” 103 This section of the Sherman Act governs concerted refusals to deal (group
boycotts). 104 Even though most concerted refusals to deal involve product boycotts,
concerted refusals to deal also may concern boycotts in labor markets, such as the market
for professional athletic services. 105
¶36
The public policy rationale against group boycotts is well fortified by the Supreme
Court of the United States. 106 In the 1914 case Eastern State Retail Lumber Dealers’
Association v. United States, the Supreme Court explained:
An act harmless when done by one may become a public wrong when
done by many acting in concert, for it then takes on the form of a
100

Women’s National Basketball Association Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. XIII(1)(b), at 52,
available at http://www.wnbpa.com/downloads/WNBA_CBA.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter
WNBA Collective Bargaining Agreement].
101
See id.
102
For a short period of time in 1998, it seemed that Tennessee University star Chamique Holdsclaw was
going to challenge the rule; however, Holdsclaw decided to return to Tennessee for her senior season on
her own accord. See Holland, supra note 98.
103
26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). Enacted in 1890, during the rise of
big business, the Sherman Act was intended to serve both political and economic purposes and to prevent
any one business from becoming more powerful than the government. See Marc Edelman, Can Antitrust
Law Save the Minnesota Twins? Why Commissioner Selig’s Contraction Plan Was Never a Sure Deal, 10
SPORTS L.J. 45, 56-57 (2003).
104
See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS § 4.13, at 159-67 (3d ed. 1998).
105
See Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 734 (2006); see also Edelman, supra note 103, at 57 (“[W]age fixing restraints
are treated as price-fixing restraints cognizable under the Sherman Act, because wage restraints reallocate
labor resources to other markets where employees are able to earn fair market value.”); Marc Edelman,
How to Curb Professional Sports’ Bargaining Power Vis-à-Vis the American City, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.
J. 280, 293 (“On the team level, professional sports seems to fall within section 1 of the [Sherman] Act,
because teams compete against each other in the labor for free-agents.”).
106
See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 104, at § 4.13; see generally Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). In Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc., the Supreme Court stated:
“Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the
forbidden category. They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific
circumstances . . . .” Id. at 212.
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conspiracy, and it may be prohibited or punished, if the result be hurtful to
the public or to the individual against whom the concerted action is
107
directed.
¶37

In other words, the danger caused by concerted conduct occurs where multiple
companies act together in a manner that reduces consumers’ freedom of choice. 108 This
outcome is troubling because the consumer loses the opportunity to use purchasing power
to indicate a preference for boycotted products, materials, or labor sources. 109
1. Prima Facie Test for Review of Allegedly Anticompetitive Conduct

¶38

In assessing whether the allegedly anticompetitive conduct violates Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, a court will begin with a prima facie review of the conduct by applying one
of the Supreme Court’s three sanctioned tests. On one end of the spectrum, if a
defendant’s business practices are so pernicious that they have no redeeming value, a
court will apply the per se rule, which presumes there is a prima facie case of an antitrust
violation without any further investigation of alleged justifications. 110 The per se rule is a
bright line rule that facilitates legal certainty and promotes judicial economy. 111 The
purpose of the per se rule is to avoid “subjective policy judgments” that most courts
recognize “are more appropriate for legislative, rather than judicial, determination.” 112
¶39
On the other end of the spectrum, if the allegedly anticompetitive conduct seems to
yield a more ambiguous effect, a court will apply Rule of Reason analysis, under which a
court conducts a full economic investigation to determine whether the defendants’
conduct is legal. 113 Applying the Rule of Reason, a court will determine whether a
plaintiff can make a prima facie showing of a violation based on the presence of the
following three factors: (1) market power, (2) anticompetitive effects that exceed any
procompetitive justifications, and (3) harm. 114
¶40
In between these two tests, if a court presumes the allegedly anticompetitive
conduct is neither completely pernicious nor completely ambiguous, that court will apply
a third type of test, called either the “quick look” or “truncated” Rule of Reason. 115

107

234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914).
See generally SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 104, at 160-61; see also Fashion Originators’ Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
109
See generally SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 104, at 164.
110
See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940); SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 104, at 124-31; McCann & Rosen,
supra note 105, at 735.
111
SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 104, at 126; Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust
Adjudication, 64 WASH & LEE L. REV. 49, 57 (2007).
112
Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D. Conn. 1977).
113
See National Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978). Indeed, the very
term “Rule of Reason” itself is somewhat of a misnomer because such analysis applies more of a standardbased approach than any hard rule. See id. at 688 (stating that “[c]ontrary to its name, the Rule [of Reason]
does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall
within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive
conditions.”); see also Crane, supra note 111, at 57.
114
See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 49 (2007).
115
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 763-64, 770 (1999).
108
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Under that test, the court will consider economic effects based on only a “rudimentary
understanding of economics.” 116
¶41
According to legal scholars, antitrust law is in the midst of undergoing a “creeping
transition,” as courts are moving away from applying the per se rule and toward applying
either the quick-look test, or, even more frequently, the full Rule of Reason. 117 This shift
has emerged as a result of a changing understanding of industrial economics, which has
cast doubt on traditional notions about competitive effects. 118
2. The Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
¶42

If the prima facie test produces the preliminary finding of an antitrust violation, a
court next considers whether the antitrust defendants can rebut this finding based on one
of antitrust law’s affirmative defenses/exemptions. 119 In the professional sports context,
the most frequently applied defense is the non-statutory labor exemption, which shields
from antitrust scrutiny any conduct that is reached through the collective bargaining
process. 120 As a matter of public policy, the non-statutory labor exemption reflects the
view that employees are better off negotiating together rather than individually, and
therefore labor law (rather than antitrust law) should apply to situations where collective
bargaining occurs. 121
¶43
Although “[t]he interaction of the [antitrust laws] and federal labor legislation is an
area of law marked more by controversy than by clarity,” 122 courts have inferred the
scope of the non-statutory labor exemption “from federal labor statutes, which set forth a
national labor policy of favoring free and private collective bargaining, which require
good faith bargaining [with respect to mandatory terms and conditions of employment],
and which delegate related rulemaking and interpretive authority to the National Labor
Relations Board.” 123 In this vein, the non-statutory labor exemption exists not only to
protect National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) authority but also “to allow meaningful
collective bargaining to take place.” 124

116

Id.
Crane, supra note 111, at 50; see also Marc Edelman, Clarett’s Run to Court No Sure Score, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Sept. 22-28, 2003, at 32, 32 (“since the middle 1980s, courts have moved away
from per se rulings where concerted refusals to deal involve professional industries. Instead, modern courts
prefer full-blown ‘rule of reason’ analysis.”).
118
See Crane, supra note 111, at 51. In more recent years, this shift has expanded with the Supreme Court
rarely intervening in antitrust cases, and a movement away from rules and toward standards carried out by
the lower courts and antitrust enforcement agencies, which have followed an impulse to manage antitrust
adjudication in a more multi-factor-dependent way. Id. at 56.
119
See PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 106-22
(5th ed. 1997).
120
McCann & Rosen, supra note 105, at 7.
121
Michael McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High School Players from the
NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 196 (2004) (citing NLRB v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S.
395 (1952)). The Supreme Court first applied the non-statutory labor exemption in the seminal case United
Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, in which it stated: “in order to effectuate congressional intent,
collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Labor Act is not
subject to the antitrust laws.” 381 U.S. 676, 710 (1965).
122
Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
123
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).
124
Id. at 237.
117
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Nevertheless, given that the non-statutory labor exemption emerges from case law,
there is a split among the circuits about how broadly the exemption applies. The Eighth
Circuit in Mackey v. National Football League held that the non-statutory labor
exemption applies only where an alleged restraint of trade: (1) involves mandatory
subjects of bargaining, (2) primarily affects the parties involved, and (3) is reached
through bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining (the Mackey Test). 125 Meanwhile, the Second
Circuit in Clarett v. National Football League held that the non-statutory labor
exemption has a broader boundary, and it applies most broadly where the alleged antitrust
injuries affect employees rather than competitors (the Clarett Test). 126 Because the
Clarett Test is far broader than the Mackey Test, the WNBA age/education policy is more
likely protected from antitrust scrutiny if the Clarett Test is applied.
B. Early Challenges to Sports League Age/Education Policies

¶45

Each of the courts hearing the first three cases that challenged a sports league’s
age/education policy found the challenged policy to be illegal based on the per se rule
and lack of applicable affirmative defenses/exceptions. 127 In the first of these challenges,
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management Inc., 128 the District Court for the Central District
of California overturned an NBA rule that required all prospective men’s basketball
players to wait at least four years after completing their high-school education before
applying for the league draft. 129 The NBA thereafter moved for a stay of this ruling,
which was granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 130 but was then overturned by
the Supreme Court. 131
¶46
In Denver Rockets, then-nineteen-year-old basketball star Spencer Haywood, who
was from an impoverished family, filed his antitrust suit against each of the teams in the
NBA, alleging that the NBA age/education policy constituted an unreasonable restraint of
trade. 132 Haywood alleged that he was entitled to a hardship exemption from the NBA
policy because he was from a poor family and the NBA policy prevented him from
earning a living by practicing his profession.133

125

543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961
(2005).
127
See Edelman, supra note 117, at 32.
128
325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
129
Id. at 1051-57.
130
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., No. 71-1089, 1971 WL 3015, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 1971),
rev’d sub nom. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1206-07 (1971).
131
Id.
132
See id. One of the sections of NBA bylaws challenged under Denver Rockets specifically stated:
A person who has not completed high school or who has completed high school but has not
entered college, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until four years after he has
been graduated or four years after his original high school class has been graduated, as the case
may be, nor may the future services of any such person be negotiated or contracted for, or
otherwise reserved. Similarly, a person who has entered college but is no longer enrolled, shall
not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until the time when he would have first become
eligible had he remained enrolled in college.
Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1059; see also McCann & Rosen, supra note 105, at 10.
133
See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1061.
126
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The District Court for the Central District of California agreed with Haywood, and
granted him summary judgment. 134 In awarding Haywood his request for summary
judgment, the court applied the per se rule, explaining that three different types of harms
emerged from the NBA age/education restriction. The court stated:
The harm resulting from a “primary” boycott such as this is threefold.
First, the victim of the boycott is injured by being excluded from the
market he seeks to enter. Second, competition in the market in which the
victim attempts to sell his services is injured. Third, by pooling their
economic power, the individual members of the NBA have, in effect,
established their own private government. 135

¶48

The court then denied each of the NBA’s three purported defenses: financial
necessity, cost effectiveness, and desire to promote advanced education. 136 Although the
court acknowledged that education policies are “commendable,” it nevertheless found
that the goals of promoting education may not “override the objective of fostering
economic competition which is embodied in the antitrust laws.” 137 In other words,
antitrust law is not a forum for social policy.
¶49
Six years later in Linseman v. World Hockey Association, 138 the District Court for
the District of Connecticut overturned another age/education policy, this time in hockey,
finding the facts of that case “indistinguishable from the Spencer Haywood case.” 139 In
Linseman, nineteen-year-old amateur Canadian hockey player Kenneth Linseman
brought a preliminary injunction suit against the World Hockey Association (WHA),
contending that the league’s prohibition against players under the age of twenty violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 140 Consistent with the court’s earlier decision in Denver
Rockets, the Linseman court found that the WHA age/education policy amounted to a per
se illegal refusal to deal, 141 and that there was not any valid purpose to the WHA rule. 142
The Linseman court also found that antitrust law did not allow for exceptions to the
Sherman Act based on a sports league’s purported economic necessity. 143 The court
noted: “Exclusion of traders from the market by means of combination or conspiracy is

134

Id. at 1058-59.
Id. at 1061. The court further added: “Of course, this is true only where the members of the
combination possess market power in a degree approaching a shared monopoly. This is uncontested in the
present case.” Id.
136
See id. at 1066.
137
Id.
138
439 F. Supp. 1315 (D.Conn. 1977).
139
Id. at 1326.
140
Id. at 1317.
141
Id. at 1323, 1325-26.
142
Id. at 1321-22.
143
Id. at 1322. The WHA defendants in Linseman had alleged that maintaining the age requirement was an
economic necessity because one of the reasons suggested for the age requirement was “that the Canadian
junior hockey league, from which the WHA and National Hockey League draw much of their talent, would
fail if the most talented teenagers were signed by professional teams.” Id. The WHA further contended
that if “these Canadian junior teams failed to draw spectator support, the pool of talent relied upon by the
professional leagues would dry up. The hockey leagues lack an organized farm system or an adequate
number of college teams as a source from which to draw their players.” Id.
135
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so inconsistent with the free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act that it is not
to be saved by reference to the need for preserving the collaborators’ profit margins.” 144
¶50
Then, for a third time, in Boris v. United States Football League, the District Court
for the Central District of California struck down an age/education policy, this time
involving professional football. 145 In Boris, plaintiff football player Robert Boris
challenged an age/education policy of the United States Football League (USFL), which
mandated that all prospective players exhaust their college eligibility before entering the
draft. 146 Ultimately, the parties reached a settlement and dismissed the case with
prejudice. 147 In the opinion approving the proposed terms of settlement, the court
overturned the USFL age/education policy, which it found per se illegal.148
C. Clarett v. National Football League
¶51

The most recent challenge to an age/education policy in professional sports, Clarett
v. National Football League, 149 saw the Second Circuit Court of Appeals uphold an NFL
age/education policy because that court found the NFL’s age/education policy was
protected from antitrust liability based on the non-statutory labor exemption. 150 In
Clarett, the Second Circuit explained that subjecting the NFL’s age/education policy to
antitrust review “would subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor policy.” 151
The court’s decision was uniquely based on the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the
non-statutory labor exemption. 152 If that case had been brought in the Eighth Circuit
(rather than the Second), a different outcome likely would have resulted.
¶52
The facts and case history in Clarett are distinctive. Maurice Clarett, who at the
time was a twenty-year-old college sophomore at Ohio State University, challenged the
NFL age/education policy that mandated that any prospective NFL player to wait at least
three years upon graduating from high school before entering the NFL draft. 153 Clarett,
who had been named the Big Ten Freshman of the Year and voted the best running back
in college by The Sporting News, claimed that he was ready to play in the NFL after only
two years of college, and that his exclusion amounted to a violation of antitrust laws. 154
After the NCAA suspended Clarett for several alleged rule infractions, Clarett decided to
challenge the NFL’s age/education policy in court.
¶53
Although Clarett argued that he had a legal right under federal antitrust law to enter
the NFL draft, the NFL viewed its age/education policy differently, articulating three
defenses: (1) that the age/education policy was immune from antitrust scrutiny based on
the non-statutory labor exemption because the policy was the result of collective
bargaining between the NFL and the players’ union, (2) that Clarett had no standing
144

Id. (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966)).
1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 66,012, at 68,461 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005).
150
Id. at 125.
151
Id. at 138 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
152
See generally id. at 133-38 (rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s widely followed Mackey Test and instead
citing to other case law, exclusively from the Second Circuit).
153
Id. at 125-26.
154
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp.2d 379, 382, 387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
145
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under antitrust laws to bring his suit, and (3) that the NFL age/education policy was
permissible under the Rule of Reason based on its purported procompetitive effects. 155
¶54
At the district court level, Judge Shira Scheindlin issued a lengthy opinion in favor
of Clarett, granting summary judgment and stating that the NFL age/education policy
“must be sacked” because none of the NFL’s defenses “hold the line.” 156 The district
court opinion analyzed the effects of the NFL age/education policy under the quick-look
test and concluded that no further inquiry was needed because “Clarett has alleged the
very type of injury . . . that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent,” in that Clarett was
boycotted from the professional football market. 157 According to the district court,
Clarett also had standing to sue the NFL because “his injury flow[ed] from a policy that
excludes all players in his position from selling their services to the only viable buyer—
the NFL,” 158 and the non-statutory labor exemption did not bar Clarett’s claim because
the NFL met none of the three prongs of the Mackey Test—the NFL age/education policy
was not a mandatory term or condition of bargaining, it did not primarily effect either the
NFL teams or members of the NFLPA, and it was not reached between the NFL teams
and the NFLPA through bona-fide arm’s length bargaining. 159
¶55
The NFL appealed this judgment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reversed the district court, finding that the non-statutory labor exemption completely
barred Clarett’s claim. 160 The Court of Appeals explained that it had “never regarded the
Eighth Circuit’s test in Mackey as defining the applicable limits of the non-statutory labor
exemption” 161 and that, according to Second Circuit case law, the non-statutory labor
exemption applied as long as the alleged restraints involved a mandatory subject of
bargaining and the exemption’s application would “ensure the successful operation of the
collective bargaining process.” 162
D. Applying the Law to the WNBA Age/Education Policy
¶56

Based on the aforementioned inconsistencies in the case law, it is impossible to
predict with certainty whether a court would find the WNBA age/education policy to be
illegal. However, applying certain assumptions about what case law a given court would
consider, one can reach general conclusions about the court’s likely outcome. For
example, if a court were to apply both the per se rule and the Mackey Test, that court
155

Id.
Id. at 382.
157
Id. In applying the quick-look test, the district court held: (1) the rule created obvious anticompetitive
effects by prohibiting access to all players who failed to satisfy the rule; (2) the rule did not promote
economic competition in the labor market; and (3) even if the NFL possessed legitimate procompetitive
arguments, there existed less restrictive alternatives to the NFL age/education policy. See id. at 406-10.
158
Id. at 382.
159
Id.
160
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005).
161
Id. at 133.
162
Id. at 143. The Second Circuit also reversed the district court on the issue of whether the age/education
policy involved a mandatory term or condition of bargaining, finding that player eligibility policies are
indeed mandatory subjects of bargaining for two reasons: (1) because these policies have a tangible effect
on the wages of other players, and (2) because these policies represent a quite literal condition for initial
employment. Id. at 139-40. On this issue, the Second Circuit’s reversal of the district court was not
surprising, as the district court’s view was not aligned with previous case law, including the Mackey
decision.
156
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would probably find the WNBA age/education policy violates antitrust law. Meanwhile,
if a court were to apply the Rule of Reason and the Mackey Test, the court would
probably find that the age/education policy does not violate the antitrust laws. Finally, if
a court were to apply the Clarett Test (irrespective of whether applied along with the per
se rule or the Rule of Reason), the court would very probably not find an antitrust
violation.
Evaluating WNBA Age/Education Policy under Antitrust Law

Prima Facie Test

Non-Statutory Labor
Exemption Test

Is there an
antitrust
violation?

Explanation

Per Se Test

Mackey Test
(mandatory subject of
bargaining, primarily
affecting the parties
involved, reached
through bona fide,
arm’s-length
bargaining)

Probably

The prima facie test is met; however,
there is a chance that the WNBA
could still avoid liability under the
non-statutory labor exemption by
showing that all three prongs of the
Mackey Test are met.

Per Se Test

Clarett Test (mandatory
subject of bargaining
and the exemption’s
application would
“ensure the successful
operation of the
collective bargaining
process”)

Very Probably
Not

The prima facie test is met; however,
there is a very likely chance that the
WNBA could show that the nonstatutory labor exemption applies
given that the age/education policy is
likely a mandatory term or condition
of bargaining.

Rule of Reason

Mackey Test
(mandatory subject of
bargaining, primarily
affecting the parties
involved, reached
through bona fide,
arm’s-length
bargaining)

Probably Not

Under the Rule of Reason, the prima
facie test is only met if the court
limits the geographic market to the
United States. If the prima facie test
is met, the WNBA could still avoid
liability under the non-statutory labor
exemption if it can show that all
three prongs of the Mackey Test are
met.

Rule of Reason

Clarett Test (mandatory
subject of bargaining
and the exemption’s
application would
“ensure the successful
operation of the
collective bargaining
process”)

Very Probably
Not

Under the Rule of Reason, the prima
facie test is only met if the court
limits the geographic market to the
United States. Even in that event,
there is a very likely chance that the
WNBA could show that the nonstatutory labor exemption applies
given that the age/education policy is
likely a mandatory term or condition
of bargaining.
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1. Prima Facie Test
¶57

If a prospective WNBA player were to challenge the WNBA age/education policy
as being a group boycott, the first issue for a court to determine is the proper standard of
review. 163 If a court were to apply the per se rule—as courts did in Denver Rockets,
Linseman, and Boris—the court would have no alternative but to find a prima facie
violation because under the per se rule, group boycotts are held illegal “without regard to
any claimed justification for the restraint.” 164 By contrast, if a court were to apply the
Rule of Reason (either in full or quick-look), the court would only find an initial showing
of an antitrust violation if the plaintiff were able to show each of the following: (1)
market power, (2) a net anti-competitive effect, and (3) harm.

i) Market Power
¶58
Market power is defined as “the power to control prices or exclude competition.” 165
Courts generally determine the presence (or absence) of market power based on an
economist’s testimony. If such testimony is not readily available, simple market share
estimates serve as a reasonable alternative. 166
¶59
When analyzing market share data, a court determines the scope of the relevant
market based on both product and geographic considerations. 167 The relevant geographic
market is defined as “the market in which the seller operates and to which the purchaser
can turn for supplies.” 168 This is “the area to which players can turn, as a practical
matter, for alternate opportunities for employment.” 169 This factor is important because
if there is a limited opportunity for practical employment, a market restriction is more
likely to be an antitrust violation.
¶60
In the context of an antitrust claim brought by a prospective WNBA player, the
presence of market power depends upon how the court defines the geographic market. If
a court were to define the geographic market as the United States—which is how most
courts have defined the market in professional sports antitrust cases 170 —the court would
find that WNBA teams maintain collective market power because there is no rival
professional women’s basketball league in the United States. This means the WNBA
would collectively have a one hundred percent market share. 171 If, however, a court were
to define the geographic market as encompassing the entire world—as the First Circuit in

163

See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769 (1999); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439
F. Supp. 1315, 1320-23 (D. Conn. 1977).
164
Linseman, 439 F.Supp. at 1320 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957)); see also
Crane, supra note 111, at 49-56.
165
See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 104, at 27 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1956)).
166
See id. at 28.
167
See id. at 33 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)).
168
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
169
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, LLC, 284 F.3d 47, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
170
See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 783 (3d Cir. 1983); Twin City
Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1296 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982).
171
See Jayda Evans, Turning Ten, SEATTLE TIMES, May 18, 2006, at D1 (explaining that the WNBA is the
only surviving women’s basketball league and that the thirteen previous attempts at women’s basketball in
America each failed).
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Fraser v. Major League Soccer recently defined the market for men’s soccer labor 172 —
then the court would find the WNBA does not have market power, and the prospective
WNBA player’s claim would fail under the Rule of Reason.
¶61
Empirical evidence seems to support finding a worldwide market for women’s
basketball labor based on the recent trend of female basketball players leaving the
WNBA in favor of European leagues. 173 As more American professional women’s
basketball players move their careers overseas in pursuit of opportunities for higher pay,
the argument that the WNBA competes against foreign leagues becomes continuously
stronger. 174 A more thorough economic study of this point, however, would be needed if
this case were eventually to go to trial, given the implicit burden of international
relocation.
ii) Net Anticompetitive Effects
¶62
A net anticompetitive effect is one where the anticompetitive effects of the
scrutinized conduct are greater than the procompetitive justifications for that conduct.
The anticompetitive effects of the WNBA age/education policy are threefold:
(1) boycotted WNBA players are harmed by their exclusion from the market,
(2) competition in the overall WNBA labor market is harmed because certain teams
cannot purchase boycotted players’ services, and (3) society overall is harmed because
the individual WNBA clubs have monopolized an otherwise free market. 175
¶63
In determining what qualifies as a procompetitive justification, courts regularly
have held that such a justification must emerge from the same economic market as the
alleged anticompetitive effects—meaning, in other words, that if the alleged
anticompetitive effect of the WNBA age policy involves the entry labor market for
women’s basketball players, courts will only consider offsetting economic benefits that
also involve the entry labor market for women’s basketball players. 176 Applying this
criterion, any impact of the WNBA age/education policy on in-game competition (such
as by equalizing the talent level among teams) or any other basketball-related market is
completely irrelevant. 177 Also, any social justification for an age/education policy is
172

See Fraser, 284 F.3d at 59. The court stated:
Here, the jury said that neither the United States nor Division I delimited the relevant market—
findings that imply that MLS faced significant competition for player services both from outside
the United States and from non-Division I teams. That inference at a minimum creates
uncertainty as to whether the jury could have found market power under section 1.

Id.
173

See Dixon, supra note 95.
Id.
175
See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (as
mentioned earlier, discussing these three anticompetitive effects in a similar case involving the group
boycott by the NBA against men’s basketball player Spencer Haywood).
176
See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
177
The court in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. addressed this very issue, rejecting the argument made by
defendant NFL teams that on-the-field competition is relevant to antitrust scrutiny of the NFL draft. Id. at
1186. In doing so, the court stated:
The draft is allegedly “procompetitive” in its effect on the playing field; but the NFL teams are
not economic competitors on the playing field, and the draft, while it may heighten athletic
competition and thus improve the entertainment product offered to the public, does not increase
competition in the economic sense of encouraging others to enter the market and to offer the
product at lower cost. Because the draft’s “anticompetitive” and “procompetitive” effects are
174

21

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2008

likewise irrelevant. 178 Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that any court would find
the WNBA policy yields any substantial procompetitive justification that offsets the
age/education policy’s clear anticompetitive effects.
¶64

iii) Harm
The final factor in Rule of Reason analysis requires the plaintiff to show that the
alleged anticompetitive conduct caused harm. In the context of labor-market antitrust
claims, courts have recognized that a showing of harm in the labor market is sufficient,
which essentially conflates this factor with the showing of a net anticompetitive effect.
Here, the excluded prospective WNBA players, as well as the potential consumers of
WNBA basketball games are harmed by the group boycott.
2. Non-Statutory Labor Exemption

¶65

Presuming a prospective plaintiff is able to make a prima facie case of an antitrust
violation against the WNBA (irrespective if whether based on the per se test, full Rule of
Reason, or quick-look), a court next considers whether the antitrust claim is barred by the
non-statutory labor exemption.
¶66
For a court to find that the non-statutory labor exemption applies, that court would
have to find either (1) that the defendant is able to meet each of the three prongs of the
Mackey Test (mandatory subject of bargaining, primarily affecting the parties involved,
reached though bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining) or (2) that the agreement involved a
mandatory subject of bargaining and that subjecting the WNBA’s age/education policy to
antitrust rules would somehow subvert fundamental principles of federal labor policy
(“the Clarett Test”). 179 The determination of which test applies depends entirely upon
where the prospective plaintiff brings suit. The Supreme Court has not indicated which
of these two tests is more appropriate, and it has failed to grant certiorari on this issue. 180
i) Is the WNBA Age/Education Policy a Mandatory Subject of Bargaining?
¶67
The first prong of both the Mackey and Clarett Tests addresses whether the WNBA
age/education policy is a mandatory subject of bargaining. There is little doubt that
irrespective of what test a court applies, a prospective plaintiff would be able to show that
the WNBA age/education policy is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 181 Applying the
Mackey Test, the age/education policy is a mandatory subject of bargaining because the
age/education policy has a direct affect on the wages of excluded prospective league
not comparable, it is impossible to “net them out” in the usual rule-of-reason balancing. The
draft’s “anticompetitive evils,” in other words, cannot be balanced against its “procompetitive
virtues,” and the draft be upheld if the latter outweigh the former. In strict economic terms, the
draft’s demonstrated procompetitive effects are nil.
Id.; see also Boris v. United States Football League, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 66,012, at 68,461 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 28, 1984) (rejecting “on-field competitive balance among USFL teams” as a defense).
178
See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186; see also Boris, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 68,461 (rejecting defendants’
arguments in favor of the age/education policy based on physical and emotional maturity).
179
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005).
180
The Supreme Court declined the opportunity to review this issue when it denied Clarett’s petition for
writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Clarett v. Nat’l Football
League, 544 U.S. 961 (2005).
181
Although the district court in Clarett did not find that an age/education policy was a mandatory term or
condition of employment, the district court was flatly reversed.
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entrants, while, applying the Clarett Test, the age/education policy is a mandatory subject
of bargaining both because the policy has a tangible affect on wages, and because it is a
condition for initial employment.
ii) Does the WNBA Age/Education Policy Primarily Affect the Parties Involved?
The second prong of the Mackey Test addresses whether the age/education policy
primarily affects the parties involved; it is unclear whether this policy also applies under
the Clarett Test.
¶69
Applying the Mackey Test, it is more likely than not that a court would find that the
WNBA age/education policy primarily affects the parties involved because both of the
parties involved (the WNBA and the boycotted player) are within the scope of the
collective bargaining process, even though a prospective WNBA entrant does not have a
voice in her union representation. 182 As explained by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Clarett (although it is not exactly clear if that court is incorporating the
second prong of Mackey into its own test), a prospective professional athlete that is
excluded from a sports league based on an age/education policy is “no different from the
typical worker who is confident that he or she has the skills to fill a job vacancy but does
not possess the qualifications or meet the requisite criteria that have been set.” 183
Nevertheless, the fact that a prospective league entrant is not yet a union member creates
at least the possibility that a court might interpret this prong as unmet.
¶68

iii) Is the WNBA Age/Education Policy Reached Through Bona Fide Arm’s-Length
Bargaining?
¶70
The final prong of the Mackey Test addresses whether the alleged agreement was
reached through bona fide arm’s-length bargaining. Under this policy, it is equally likely
as not that a court would find the WNBA age/education policy is a product of bona fide,
arm’s-length bargaining. 184 Presuming the court applies the Mackey Test, the main
argument in favor of finding that the age/education policy is a product of arm’s-length
bargaining is that the policy appears directly in the league collective bargaining
agreement, which was signed by both the WNBA teams and the WNBPA. 185 However,
the main argument against such a finding is that the WNBA enforced its age/education
policy prior to the start of its collective bargaining relationship with the WNBPA, and the
WNBPA did not obtain anything of value in exchange for allowing the WNBA teams to
retain that policy. 186 As stated in case law: “The union’s acceptance of the status quo
[under the circumstances] cannot serve to immunize [a purported agreement between a
league and a players’ union] from scrutiny of the Sherman Act.” 187 Indeed, under the
third prong of the Mackey Test, a court may find the age/education policy is not immune
182

See generally Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615-16 (8th Cir. 1976).
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141.
184
See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
185
See WNBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. XIII, supra note 100, at 52.
186
See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616 (explaining that based on the court’s independent review of the record,
including the parties’ bargaining history, there was not substantial evidence to support a finding of bona
fide, arm’s-length bargaining over the NFL’s Rozelle Rule preceding the execution of the 1968 and 1970
collective bargaining agreements, because the Rozelle Rule, which governs league free agency, “imposes
significant restrictions on players, and its form has remained unchanged since it was unilaterally
promulgated by the clubs in 1963.”).
187
Id.
183

23

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2008

from antitrust scrutiny based on the following evidence: (1) the WNBA unilaterally
enforced its age/education policy prior to the formation of a players’ union; (2) the
age/education policy was unaltered during any of the subsequent collective bargaining
processes; (3) no evidence exists that the WNBPA received anything of value in
exchange for consenting to the age/education policy; and (4) as compared with other
professional sports bargaining relationships, female athletes have traditionally struggled
with substantially lower bargaining power than males, as indicated by their substantially
lower salaries and inferior conditions of employment. 188
¶71
Analysis of whether the age/education policy was reached through bona fide,
arm’s-length bargaining is entirely irrelevant if the court applies the Clarett Test.
IV. ANALYZING THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE WNBA AGE/EDUCATION POLICY
¶72

Because antitrust law seeks to address economic issues and not social policy, even
if the WNBA age/education policy were to withstand antitrust scrutiny, the policy still
results in substantial social harm (and vice versa).
¶73
From an empirical perspective, research into the correlation between academic
experience and life success has yielded mixed results about the value of an age/education
policy in professional sports. A recent study performed by sports law professor Michael
McCann indicates that when men’s professional basketball players attend college for any
length of time, these athletes become more (rather than less) likely to incur legal trouble
later in life. 189 Meanwhile, a different study performed by Dr. Leo Lewis, a former
professional football player and current associate athletic director at the University of
Minnesota, indicates that more educated NFL football players are less likely to be
involved in negative activities. 190 Recognizing that these research studies provide mixed
reviews about the value of an age/education requirement, it becomes important to
evaluate the WNBA age/education policy along an even broader range of criteria, which
reveals additional benefits and additional harms.
A. Social Benefits of the WNBA Age/Education Policy
¶74

Antitrust issues aside, there are three social benefits to the WNBA age/education
policy. First, the WNBA age/education policy has facilitated the perception of WNBA
players as both scholars and athletes, and therefore also as role models. 191 Hence, their
image is one of synergy between academics and athletics. 192 Indeed, one of the missions
188

See id. at 615-16 (finding that there was no bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining over the Rozelle Rule
preceding the execution of the 1963 and 1970 collective bargaining agreements because (1) the rule
imposed significant restrictions on players, (2) the rule remained unchanged in collective bargaining from
the time it was unilaterally imposed by the league, and (3) the rule was not accepted by the players union as
part of a quid pro quo).
189
See Michael McCann, NBA Players That Get In Trouble With the Law: Do Age and Education Level
Matter? SPORTS LAW BLOG, July 20, 2005, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2005/07/nba-players-that-get-introuble-with_20.html (McCann performed his research by looking at arrest propensity among NBA players,
controlling for age and level of education among arrested players).
190
See Leo Lewis & Roger Harrold, 2003 Player Development Survey Report 45 (2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors) (noting the positive effects of securing an education, such as gaining
career mobility options).
191
Earl Smith & Angela Hattery, African American Community: The Dynamics of Race, Class, Gender,
and Community, in DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN COLLEGE SPORTS: SPORT MANAGEMENT AND THE
STUDENT ATHLETE 390-91 (Dana D. Brooks & Ronald C. Althouse eds., 2007).
192
Linda Sheryl Green & Tina Sloan-Green, Beyond Tokenism to Empowerment: The Black Women in
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behind the WNBA is to encourage American girls to explore athletic opportunities. 193
However, another mission of society is to encourage girls to pursue educational
opportunities, especially in light of the fact that education was for years denied to
women. 194 By maintaining a graduation policy for WNBA players, “the league promotes
a message that not only can females excel in athletics, but also that females can excel
academically.” 195 Some professional women’s basketball players find this mission
especially important. 196 For example, when University of Tennessee basketball superstar
Chamique Holdsclaw decided she would not be the first to challenge the age/education
policy in women’s basketball, she did so because she wanted to act in a manner that she
believed showed leadership to young women. 197 In a March 1998 article published in the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Holdsclaw was quoted as stating, “I really want to see these
young women set goals. And I want one of those goals to be to get that degree.” 198 In an
era where so many female celebrities receive media attention for misconduct, the current
structure of the WNBA provides young women with more positive alternatives as role
models. 199
¶75
Second, the WNBA age/education policy helps to prepare its players for nonbasketball careers upon personal retirement or league dissolution. Preparing for postbasketball careers is arguably more important for women’s basketball players than for
those athletes in the men’s professional sports leagues because WNBA players earn
substantially lower salaries than those playing in the four premier men’s leagues. 200
Although there is no actual barrier that prevents a prospective women’s basketball player
from attending college either during or after her professional career, there is an argument
that attending college later in life, when responsibilities are greater, would add constraints
for these women not found in the traditional college experience. 201 Also, many women
that plan to attend college later in life ultimately find it difficult or impossible to do so. 202
Sport Foundation, in DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN COLLEGE SPORTS: SPORT MANAGEMENT AND THE
STUDENT-ATHLETE 314-27 (Dana D. Brooks & Ronald C. Althouse eds., 2007).
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Harrison, supra note 10, at 12.
196
See Raising the Roof: Seven Athletes for the 21st Century (ABC television broadcast Feb. 4, 2000) (on
file with authors).
197
See Holland, supra note 98.
198
Id.
199
For examples of recent media attention surrounding female celebrities in trouble with the law, including
the drug use and drunk driving of young female celebrities Paris Hilton, Lindsay Lohan, Nicole Richie, and
Britney Spears, see, e.g., Sean Smith, Summer of Scandal!, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, Aug. 31, 2007, at
18; At a Glance: Outcomes of Recent Celebrity DUI Cases, CINCINNATI POST, Aug. 25, 2007, at 8B; Are
Media Icons the Wrong Role Models?, BRAY PEOPLE (Ireland), Aug. 23, 2007, at General News Section.
For a more promising article, indicating that not all girls want to emulate these negative role models, see,
e.g., Rose Mary Reiz & Chad Swiatecki, Bad Girls: Whatcha Gonna Do? Area Teens Say They Don’t
Look Up to Starlets with Bad Reps, FLINT J., Aug. 12, 2007, at G1.
200
In 2006, the average WNBA salary was $50,000 per year, with a rookie salary minimum of $31,800 and
star players earning about $90,000. Melissa Isaacson, Promotions in Motion: WNBA Athletes Do More
than Play: They Also Sell the League, CHI. TRIB., May 17, 2006, at Sports 8. By contrast, at the time of the
Clarett lawsuit, the NFL rookie salary minimum was $225,000 per year and the average NFL player earned
$1,258,800 per season. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp.2d 379, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Meanwhile, the NBA rookie minimum in 2006 was nearly $400,000 per year and the league average was
$4,500,000. See Isaacson, supra note 200.
201
See ALEXANDER ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE? 15-16 (1993).
202
See generally CAROLINE SOTELLO VIERNES TURNER, FACULTY OF COLOR IN ACADEME, BITTERSWEET
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Former Pennsylvania State University men’s basketball coach Jerry Dunn therefore
argues that the real problem with college athletes entering the professional ranks early is
that these athletes are surrendering a one-time opportunity:
They’re completely skipping a part of their lives they can never get back.
All of a sudden you can’t turn back, and the responsibilities become
greater. They’re skipping the basic foundation they need to take care of
themselves and their families for the rest of their lives. 203
¶76

A third advantage of the current WNBA age/education policy is simplicity.
Although imperfect, age has been used throughout history as a reasonable proxy for
maturity and ability, and maturity is often used as a proxy for emotional readiness to
compete in professional sports. 204 Although age does not tell anything about a specific
person, it indicates certain societal assumptions. 205 For example, one must be eighteen
years old to vote. 206 This does not mean that a person younger than eighteen years old
cannot be precocious enough to cast a meaningful ballot; 207 however, from a legal,
practical, and ethical perspective, society cannot evaluate each potential voter
individually, so society accepts age as a proxy. 208 Although sometimes it is frustrating to
live in a world where decisions about people are made through generalizations about
immutable characteristics such as age, if the WNBA were instead required to make a
league-wide assessment about each potential league entrant on a case-by-case basis,
doing so would lead to additional legal challenges about the merits of specific
decisions. 209 As a result, a bright-line rule that a potential league entrant must have at
least a minimum age or education level might be reasonable, assuming of course that
maturity is an important characteristic for a female pro-basketball player to have.
B. Social Harms from the WNBA Age/Education Policy

¶77

Despite the three purported advantages of the current policy, there are also social
harms inherent in the requirement that prospective professional women’s basketball
players wait until reaching a certain age or education status before entering the league.
First, the WNBA policy prevents adult women from making their own choices between
college and professionalism. By limiting women basketball players’ right to choose
between education and career opportunities, these women’s individual interests are
subordinated to society’s will. Moreover, because the WNBA has a monopoly over
American women’s professional basketball opportunities, by denying young women the
opportunity to enter the WNBA draft, the WNBA denies them the opportunity to play
professional basketball in any capacity in the United States, as there are no other
professional women’s leagues available to them. 210
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203
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¶78

Second, the WNBA policy inhibits young women from securing financial
independence. 211 The WNBA minimum starting salary is $32,400. 212 While $32,400 in
today’s economy is not a huge amount of money, that income is sufficient to allow a
young woman to independently support herself. By denying young, female basketball
players the opportunity to pursue financial independence, these women remain
monetarily tied to others, such as parents and, potentially, men. 213 Such an outcome is
dangerous, especially in light of generations past, in which young women played a
subservient role in society. 214 This outcome also defeats the argued purpose behind the
age/education policy, which is to ensure players’ independence and empowerment.
¶79
Third, the WNBA policy mandates that female basketball players develop their
careers through the NCAA and higher education, an institution that profits from studentathletes’ work-product. 215 An unavoidable consequence of the WNBA age/education
policy is that many female basketball players, who otherwise would be eligible to earn a
living playing professional basketball, are instead required to forego payment according
to NCAA rules. 216 Even more troubling, women’s basketball players are not permitted to
enjoy the full college experience, as it is estimated that the average Division I varsity
athlete spends at least forty hours per week practicing, lifting weights, attending team
meetings, traveling and playing her sport. 217 With these policies in mind, although the
NCAA claims to protect student-athletes from exploitation, many argue that the NCAA is
really not helping the cause of young athletes. 218
V. CONCLUSION
¶80

There is a natural tension between the individual’s right to earn wages as a
professional athlete and the culture of athletes’ socialization as student-athletes—a
concept that boasts the highest ideals of intellectualism and athleticism in higher
education, albeit at the “amateur” level. The WNBA presently has a policy that shapes
the culture of their professional athletes as college graduates and mentors to youth that
worship them. However, the question of whether this policy is legal, much less ethical,
requires greater scrutiny.
¶81
From a legal perspective, determining whether the WNBA age/education policy is
permissible boils down to a few simple questions about the applicable law. If a court
were to apply the per se rule and the Mackey Test to the WNBA age/education policy,
that court would probably find the age/education policy violates antitrust laws. However,
if a court were to apply either the Rule of Reason or the Clarett Test, the WNBA
age/education policy would more likely survive, especially if a court were to find that the
market for women’s basketball labor is global.
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¶82

From an ethical perspective, while there are reasonable arguments on both sides,
assessing the merits of the WNBA age/education policy requires answering the following
two questions: (1) how does the WNBA age/education policy impact the cultural
perception of academics and vocational mobility in a society that continues to value
immediate versus delayed gratification; and (2) should societal goals, especially those
that are not absolute, ever obligate an individual athlete to forego personal gratification
based on the alleged positive externalities upon others? Once again, one could draw
reasonable conclusions on either side of the issue, especially given the important role that
Title IX and the collegiate athletic experience has played in fostering the emerging
demand for women’s professional sports.
¶83
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that any analysis of the legal, ethical, and
cultural issues involving the WNBA age/education policy must examine the positive,
negative, and “gray area” outcomes of each suggested alternative. The challenge for our
legal system then becomes how to continue to properly provide incentives for young
female athletes to pursue advanced education without disturbing these athletes’ personal
autonomy and right to pursue independent financial interests.
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